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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing is critical to the security of face
recognition systems. Depth supervised learning has been
proven as one of the most effective methods for face anti-
spoofing. Despite the great success, most previous works
still formulate the problem as a single-frame multi-task
one by simply augmenting the loss with depth, while ne-
glecting the detailed fine-grained information and the in-
terplay between facial depths and moving patterns. In con-
trast, we design a new approach to detect presentation at-
tacks from multiple frames based on two insights: 1) de-
tailed discriminative clues (e.g., spatial gradient magni-
tude) between living and spoofing face may be discarded
through stacked vanilla convolutions, and 2) the dynam-
ics of 3D moving faces provide important clues in detect-
ing the spoofing faces. The proposed method is able to
capture discriminative details via Residual Spatial Gra-
dient Block (RSGB) and encode spatio-temporal informa-
tion from Spatio-Temporal Propagation Module (STPM) ef-
ficiently. Moreover, a novel Contrastive Depth Loss is pre-
sented for more accurate depth supervision. To assess the
efficacy of our method, we also collect a Double-modal
Anti-spoofing Dataset (DMAD) which provides actual depth
for each sample. The experiments demonstrate that the
proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art results on five
benchmark datasets including OULU-NPU, SiW, CASIA-
MFSD, Replay-Attack, and the new DMAD. Codes will
be available at https://github.com/clks-wzz/
FAS-SGTD.
1. Introduction
Face recognition technology has become the most in-
dispensable component in many interactive AI systems for
∗ denotes the corresponding author.
Living Spoofing
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Figure 1. Spatial gradient magnitude difference between living (a)
and spoofing (b) face. Notice that the large difference in gradient
maps despite their similarities in the original RGB images.
their convenience and human-level accuracy. However,
most of existing face recognition systems are easily to be
spoofed through presentation attacks (PAs) ranging from
printing a face on paper (print attack) to replaying a face
on a digital device (replay attack) or bringing a 3D-mask
(3D-mask attack). Therefore, not only the research commu-
nity but also the industry has recognized face anti-spoofing
[18, 19, 4, 33, 39, 11, 23, 55, 1, 29, 12, 49, 45, 54, 21] as a
critical role in securing the face recognition system.
In the past few years, both traditional methods [14,
42, 9] and CNN-based methods [35, 38, 20, 24, 46] have
shown effectiveness in discriminating between the living
and spoofing face. They often formalize face anti-spoofing
as a binary classification between spoofing and living im-
ages. However, these approaches are challenging to explore
the nature of spoofing patterns, such as the loss of skin de-
tails, color distortion, moire´ pattern, and spoofing artifacts.
In order to overcome this issue, many auxiliary depth
supervised face anti-spoofing methods have been devel-
oped. Intuitively, the images of living faces contain face-
like depth, whereas the images of spoofing faces in print and
by replaying carriers only have planar depth. Thus, Atoum
et al. [2] and Liu et al. [34] propose single-frame depth su-
pervised CNN architectures, and improve the presentation
attack detection (PAD) accuracy.
By surveying the past face anti-spoofing methods, we
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Figure 2. Temporal depth difference between live and spoof (print
attack here) scenes. The change in camera viewpoint can result in
facial motion among different keypoints. In the living scene (a),
the angle α between nose and right ear is getting smaller, while the
angle β1 between left ear and nose is getting larger. However, in
the spoofing scene (b), the observation could be different α′ < β′2,
and β′1 > γ′.
notice there are two problems that have not yet been fully
solved: 1) Traditional methods usually design local descrip-
tors for solving PAD while modern deep learning methods
can learn to extract relatively high-level semantic features
instead. Despite their effectiveness, we argue that low-level
fine-grained patterns can also play a vital role in distin-
guishing living and spoofing faces, e.g. the spatial gradi-
ent magnitude shown in Fig. 1. So how to aggregate local
fine-grained information into convolutional networks is still
unexplored for face anti-spoofing task. 2) Recent depth su-
pervised face anti-spoofing methods [2, 34] estimate facial
depth based on a single frame and leverage depth as dense
pixel-wise supervision in a direct manner. We argue that the
virtual discrimination of depth between living and spoofing
faces can be explored more adequately by multiple frames.
A vivid and exaggerated example with assumed micro mo-
tion is illustrated in Fig. 2.
To address the problems, we present a novel depth super-
vised spatio-temporal network with Residual Spatial Gradi-
ent Block (RSGB) and Spatio-Temporal Propagation Mod-
ule (STPM). Inspired by ResNet [22] , our RSGB aggre-
gates learnable convolutional features with spatial gradi-
ent magnitude via shortcut connection. As a result, both
local fine-grained patterns and traditional convolution fea-
tures can be captured via stacked RSGB. To better utilize
the information from multiple frames, STPM is designed
for propagating short-term and long-term spatio-temporal
features into depth reconstruction. To supervise the models
with facial depth more effectively, we propose a Contrastive
Depth Loss (CDL) to learn the topography of facial points.
We believe that the accuracy of facial depth directly af-
fects the establishment of the relationship between tempo-
ral motion and facial depth. So we collect a double-modal
anti-spoofing dataset named Double-modal Anti-spoofing
Dataset (DMAD) which provides actual depth map for each
sample. Extensive experiments are conducted to show that
actual depth is more appropriate for monocular PAD than
the generated depth. Note that this paper mainly focuses on
the planar attack, which is the most common in practice.
We summarize the main contributions below.
• We propose a novel depth supervised architecture to
capture discriminative details via Residual Spatial Gra-
dient Block (RSGB) and encode spatio-temporal in-
formation from Spatio-Temporal Propagation Module
(STPM) efficiently from monocular frame sequences.
• We develop a Contrastive Depth Loss to learn the to-
pography of facial points for depth supervised PAD.
• We collect a double-modal dataset to verify that the ac-
tual depth is more appropriate for monocular PAD than
the generated depth. This indicates an insight that col-
lecting corresponding depth image to the RGB image
brings benefit to the progress of the monocular PAD.
• We demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance by
our method on widely used face anti-spoofing bench-
marks.
2. Related Work
Roughly speaking, previous face anti-spoofing works
generally fall into three categories: binary supervised, depth
supervised, and temporal-based methods.
Binary supervised Methods Since face anti-spoofing is
essentially a binary classification problem, most of pre-
vious anti-spoofing methods train a classifier under bi-
nary supervision, e.g., spoofing face as 0 and living face
as 1. The early works usually rely on hand-crafted fea-
tures, such as LBP [14, 15, 37], SIFT [42], SURF [9],
HoG [28, 52], DoG [43, 48], and traditional classifiers, such
as SVM and Random Forests. Because of the sensitiveness
of manually-engineered features, traditional methods often
generalize poorly across varied conditions such as camera
devices, lighting conditions and presentation attack instru-
ments (PAIs). Recently, CNN has emerged as a powerful
tool in face anti-spoofing tasks with the help of hardware
advancement and data abundance. For instance, in early
works like [30, 41], pre-trained VGG-face model is fine-
tuned to extract features in a binary-classification setting.
However, most of them consider face anti-spoofing as a bi-
nary classification problem with cross-entropy loss, which
easily learns the arbitrary patterns such as screen bezel.
Depth supervised Methods Compared with the binary
setting, depth supervised methods aim to learn more faith-
ful patterns. In [2], the depth map of a face is utilized
as a supervisory signal for the first time. They propose a
two-stream CNN-based approach for face anti-spoofing, by
extracting both the patch features and holistic depth maps
from the face images. It shows that depth estimation is ben-
eficial for modeling face anti-spoofing to obtain promising
results, especially on higher-resolution images. In another
work [34], the authors propose a face anti-spoofing method
by augmenting spatial facial depth as an auxiliary supervi-
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Figure 3. Illustration of the overall framework. The inputs are consecutive frames with a fixed interval. Each frame is processed by cascaded
RSGB with a shared backbone which generates a corresponding coarse depth map. The number in RSGB cubes denotes the output channel
number of RSGB. STPM is plugged between frames for estimating the temporal depth, which is used for refining the corresponding coarse
depth map. The framework works well by learning with the overall loss functions.
sion along with temporal rPPG signals. More recently, [26]
attempts to learn spoof noise and depth for generalized face
anti-spoofing. However, these methods take stacked vanilla
convolutional networks as the backbone and fail to capture
the rich detailed patterns for depth estimation.
Temporal-based Methods Temporal information plays
a vital role in face anti-spoofing tasks. Most of the prior
works focus on the movement of key parts of the face. For
example in [40, 41], the eye-blinking fact is used to predict
spoofing. However, these methods are vulnerable to replay
attacks since they heavily rely on some heuristic assump-
tions about the nature of these attacks. More general ap-
proaches like 3D convolution [20] or LSTM [50, 53] have
recently been used to distinguish the live from spoof im-
ages. In addition, optical flow magnitude map and Shearlet
feature have been taken as inputs in [16] to the CNN due to
the obvious difference in flow patterns between living and
spoofing faces. Based on the different color changes be-
tween the living and spoofing face videos, rPPG [31, 34, 32]
features are also explored for PAD. To the best of our
knowledge, no depth supervised temporal-based methods
has ever been proposed for face anti-spoofing task.
3. The Proposed Approach
In this section, we first present our advanced depth-
supervised spatio-temporal network structure, including
Residual Spatial Gradient Block (RSGB) and Spatio-
Temporal Propagation Module (STPM). Then our proposed
novel Contrastive Depth Loss (CDL) and the overall loss
would be demonstrated.
3.1. Network Structure
Designed in an end-to-end depth supervised fashion, our
proposed framework takes Nf -frame face images as in-
put and predicts the corresponding depth map directly. As
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Figure 4. Residual spatial gradient block.
shown in Fig. 3, the backbone is composed of cascaded
RSGB followed by pooling layers, intending to extract fine-
grained spatial features in low-level, mid-level and high-
level, respectively. Then these multi-level features are con-
catenated to predict coarse depth map for each frame.
In order to capture rich dynamic information, STPM
is plugged between frames. Short-term Spatio-Temporal
Block (STSTB) picks up spatio-temporal features from ad-
jacent frames while ConvGRU propagates these short-term
features in a multi-frame long-term view. Finally, the tem-
poral depth maps estimated from STPM are used to refine
the coarse depth from the backbone.
3.1.1 Residual Spatial Gradient Block
Fine-grained spatial details are vital for distinguishing
the bona fide and attack presentations. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the gradient magnitude response between the living
(Fig. 1(a)) and spoofing (Fig. 1(b)) face is quite different,
which gives the insight to design a residual spatial gradi-
ent block (RSGB) for capturing such discriminative clues.
In this paper, we take the well-known Sobel [27] operation
to compute gradient magnitude. In a nutshell, the horizon-
tal and vertical gradients can be derived from the following
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convolutions respectively:
Fhor(x)=
−1 0 +1−2 0 +2
−1 0 +1
x, Fver(x)=
−1 −2 −10 0 0
+1 +2 +1
x,
(1)
where  denotes the depthwise convolution operation, and
x represents the input feature maps. As shown in Fig. 4,
our RSGB adopts the advanced shortcut connection struc-
ture to aggregate the learnable convolutional features with
gradient magnitude information, which intends to enhance
representation ability of fine-grained spatial details. It can
be formulated as
y = φ(N (F (x, {Wi}) +N (Fhor(x′)2 + Fver(x′)2))),
(2)
where x represents the input features maps while x
′
denotes
the feature maps altered through 1x1 convolution, which in-
tends to keep the consistent channel numbers for subsequent
residual addition. y denotes the output feature maps. N
and φ denote the normalization and Relu layer, respectively.
The function F (x, {Wi}) represents the residual gradient
magnitude mapping to be learned. Note that the proposed
RSGB is able to plug in both image and feature levels, ex-
tracting rich spatial context for depth regression task.
3.1.2 Spatio-Temporal Propagation Module
Virtual discrimination of depth between living and spoof-
ing faces can be explored adequately by multiple frames.
Therefore, we design STPM to extract multi-frame spatio-
temporal features for depth estimation, via Short-term
Spatio-Temporal Block (STSTB) and ConvGRU.
STSTB. As illustrated in Fig. 3, STSTB extracts the
generalized short-term spatio-temporal information by fus-
ing five kinds of features: the current compressed features
Fl(t), the current spatial gradient features FSl (t), the future
spatial gradient features FSl (t + 4t), the temporal gradi-
ent features FTl (t), and the STSTB features from the pre-
vious level STSTBl−1(t). The fused features can pro-
vide weighted spatial and temporal information in a learn-
able/adaptive way. In this paper, the spatial and tempo-
ral gradients are implemented with Sobel-based depthwise
convolution (similar to Eq. 1) and element-wise subtraction
of temporal features, respectively. Note that the 1x1 convo-
lutions intend to compress the channel number with more
efficiency.
Different from the related OFF [47] work, we consider
both spatial gradient of the current compressed features
FSl (t) and future spatial gradient features F
S
l (t+4t) while
OFF only considers FSl (t). Moreover, current compressed
feature Fl(t) itself also plays an important role in recover-
ing the fine depth map, which is concatenated in STSTB
as well. The detailed comparison between STSTB and OFF
will be studied in Sec. 5.3, which shows the advancement of
STSTB especially for depth-supervised face anti-spoofing
task.
ConvGRU. As short-term information between two
consecutive frames from STSTB has limited representation
ability, it is natural to use the recurrent neural network to
capture long-range spatio-temporal context. However, the
classical LSTM and GRU [13] neglect the spatial informa-
tion in hidden units. In consideration of the spatial neighbor
relationship in the hidden layers, ConvGRU is conducted
for propagating the long-range spatio-temporal information.
ConvGRU can be described as below:
Rt = σ(Kr ⊗ [Ht−1, Xt]), Ut = σ(Ku ⊗ [Ht−1, Xt]),
Hˆt = tanh(Khˆ ⊗ [Rt ∗Ht−1, Xt]),
Ht = (1− Ut) ∗Ht−1 + Ut ∗ Hˆt, (3)
where Xt, Ht, Ut and Rt are the matrix of input, output,
update gate and reset gate, Kr,Ku,Khˆ are the kernels in
the convolution layer,⊗ is convolution operation, ∗ denotes
element wise product, and σ denotes the sigmoid activation
function.
3.1.3 Depth Map Refinement
Forwarding the RSGB based backbone and STPM for a
given Nf -frame input, we could obtain the correspond-
ing coarse depth maps Dtsingle and temporal depth maps
Dtmulti, respectively, where t ∈ [1, Nf − 1] denotes the
t-th frame. Then Dtmulti is utilized to refine D
t
single in a
weighted summation manner:
Dtrefined = (1− α) ·Dtsingle + α ·Dtmulti, α ∈ [0, 1], (4)
where α is the trade-off weight between Dtsingle and D
t
multi.
The higher value of α indicates the more importance about
the multi-frame spatio-temporal features. Finally, Nf − 1
refined depth maps {Dtrefined}Nf−1t=1 are obtained.
3.2. Loss Function
Besides designing the network architecture, we also need
an appropriate loss function to guide the network training.
One major step-forward of the current study is that we de-
sign a novel Contrastive Detph Loss, which is able to com-
bine with classical loss, further boosting performance.
3.2.1 Contrastive Detph Loss
In the classical depth-based face anti-spoofing, Euclidean
Distance Loss (EDL) is usually used for pixel-wise super-
vision, which is formulated:
LEDL =||DP − DG||22, (5)
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Figure 5. Contrastive Depth Loss. The purple, yellow, and white
pieces indicate 1, -1, and 0, respectively. There are totally eight
contrastive convolution kernels in CDL.
where DP and DG are the predicted depth and groundtruth
depth, respectively. EDL applies supervision on the pre-
dicted depth based on pixel one by one, ignoring the depth
difference among adjacent pixels. Intuitively, EDL merely
assists the network to learn the absolute distance between
the objects to the camera. However, the distance relation-
ship of different objects is also important to be supervised
for the depth learning. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 5, we
propose the Contrastive Depth Loss (CDL) to offer extra
strong supervision, which improves the generality of the
depth-based face anti-spoofing model:
LCDL =
∑
i
||KCDLi  DP − KCDLi  DG||22, (6)
where KCDLi is the ith contrastive convolution kernel, i ∈
[0, 7]. The details of the kernels can be found in Fig. 5.
3.2.2 Overall Loss
In view of the potentially unclear depth map, we hereby
consider a binary loss when looking for the difference be-
tween living and spoofing depth map. Note that the depth
supervision is decisive, whereas the binary supervision
takes an assistant role to discriminate the different kinds of
depth maps.
Lbinary = −BG ∗ log(fcs(Davg)), (7)
Loverall = β · Lbinary + (1− β) · (LEDL + LCDL), (8)
where BG is the binary groundtruth label, Davg is the
pool averaged map of {Dtrefined}Nf−1t=1 , and fcs denotes
two fully connected layers and one softmax layer after the
element-wise averaged depth maps, which outputs the logits
of two classes, β is the hyper-parameter to trade-off binary
loss and depth loss in the final overall loss Loverall.
4. Double-modal Anti-spoofing Dataset
In this work, we collect a real double-modal dataset
(RGB and Depth). There are three kinds of display ma-
terials in replay attack: AMOLED screen, OLED screen,
IPS/TFT screen. Meanwhile, three kinds of paper materials
in print attacks are adopted: high-quality A4 paper, coated
Figure 6. Some examples of DMAD. The actual depth is more
precise than the generated depth.
Table 1. The details of our collected DMAD. This protocol of split-
ting subsets aims to evaluate the generalization of methods under
unseen presentation materials.
Subset Subject Session Modal Types Presentation Material # of live/attack vid.
Train 1˜100 1˜3 RGB, Depth A4 Paper, AMOLED 900101˜200 1˜3 RGB, Depth Coated Paper, OLED 900
Test 201˜300 1˜3 RGB, Depth Poster Paper, IPS/TFT 900
paper, and poster paper. The capture camera is RealSense
SR300, which can offer corresponding RGB and Depth im-
ages. There are 300 subjects, each of which is recorded in
three sessions and contains one real category and two at-
tack categories (print and replay). Totally, we obtain 2700
samples (4˜12 seconds videos) in less than two months with
two human workers. Tab. ?? demonstrates the details of
DMAD, and Fig. 6 shows some corresponding examples.
5. Experiments
5.1. Databases and Metrics
5.1.1 Databases
Five databases - OULU-NPU [10, 5], SiW [34], CASIA-
MFSD [56], Replay-Attack [12], DMAD are used in our
experiment. OULU-NPU [10] is a high-resolution database,
consisting of 4950 real access and spoofing videos and con-
taining four protocols to validate the generalization of mod-
els. SiW [34] contains more live subjects and three proto-
cols are used for testing. CASIA-MFSD [56] and Replay-
Attack [12] both contain low-resolution videos.
5.1.2 Performance Metrics
In OULU-NPU and SiW dataset, we follow the original pro-
tocols and metrics for a fair comparison. OULU-NPU, SiW
and DMAD utilize 1) Attack Presentation Classification Er-
ror RateAPCER, which evaluates the highest error among
all PAIs (e.g. print or display), 2) Bona Fide Presentation
Classification Error Rate BPCER, which evaluates the er-
ror of real access data, and 3) ACER [25], which evaluates
the mean of APCER and BPCER:
ACER =
APCER+BPCER
2
. (9)
5
HTER is adopted in the cross-database testing between
CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack, evaluating the mean of
False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate
(FAR):
HTER =
FRR+ FAR
2
. (10)
5.2. Implementation Details
5.2.1 Depth Generation
Dense face alignment method PRNet [17] is adopted to esti-
mate the 3D shape of the living face and generate the facial
depth map DG ∈ R32×32. A typical sample can be found
in the third row of Fig. 6. To distinguish living faces from
spoofing faces, at the training stage, we normalize living
depth map in a range of [0, 1], while setting spoofing depth
map to 0, which is similar to [34].
5.2.2 Training Strategy
The proposed method is trained with a two-stage strategy:
Stage 1: We train the backbone with cascaded RSGB by the
depth loss LEDL and LCDL, in order to learn a fundamen-
tal representation to predict coarse depth maps. Stage 2: We
fix the parameters of the backbone, and train the STPM part
by the overall loss Loverall for refining depth maps. Our
networks are fed by Nf frames, which are sampled by an
interval of three frames. This sampling interval makes sam-
pled frames maintain enough temporal information in the
limited GPU memory.
5.2.3 Testing Strategy
For the final classification score, we feed the sequen-
tial frames into the network and obtain depth maps
{Dtrefined}Nf−1t=1 and the living logits bˆ in fcs(Davg). The
final living score can be obtained by:
score = β · bˆ+(1−β) ·
∑Nf−1
t=1 ||Dtrefined ∗Mt||1
Nf − 1 , (11)
where β is the same as that in equation 8, Mt is the mask of
face at frame t , which can be generated by the dense face
landmarks in PRNet [17], and the second module denotes
that we compute the mean of depth values in the facial areas
as one part of the score.
5.2.4 Hyper-parameter Setting
Our proposed method is implemented in Tensorflow, with
a learning rate of 1e-4 for single-frame part and 1e-2 for
multi-frame part. The batch size of single-frame part is 48,
and that of multi-frame part is 2 with Nf being 5 in our
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Figure 7. Ablation study of α in Eq. 4 on OULU-NPU Protocol
3. The red line denotes the mean ACER(%) value while the or-
ange/blue area denotes the range of standard deviation.
Table 2. The results of ablation study on OULU-NPU Protocol 3.
Module LCDL RSGB STSTB OFF ConvGRU Lbinary ACER(%)
Model 1 6.25±3.20
Model 2
√
5.07±1.83
Model 3
√ √
3.19±0.90
Model 4
√ √ √
2.99±0.72
Model 5
√ √ √ √
2.85±0.49
Model 6
√ √ √ √ √
3.20±1.00
Model 7
√ √ √ √ √
2.71±0.63
experiment. Adadelta optimizer is used in our training pro-
cedure, with ρ as 0.95 and  as 1e-8. We set α = 0.6 and
β = 0.8 by our experimental experience.
5.3. Experimental Comparison
5.3.1 Ablation Study
Seven architectures are implemented to demonstrate the ef-
ficacy of vital parts (i.e., RSGB, STPM and loss functions)
in the proposed method. As shown in Tab. 2, Model 1 can be
treated as a raw baseline, consisting of a backbone network
with stacked vanilla convolutions. Model 2 is supervised
with extra contrastive depth loss. Based on Model 2, vanilla
convolutions are replaced by RSGB in Model 3. Moreover,
Model 4 and Model 5 are designed for validating the ef-
fectiveness of STSTB and ConvGRU. In Model 6, STSTB
is replaced by normal OFF [47]. Model 7 is our complete
architecture with all modules and losses.
Efficacy of the Modules and Loss Functions. It can
be seen from Tab. 2 that Model 2 outperforms Model 1,
which means our proposed CDL helps to estimate more
accurate depth maps. With the progressive lower ACER
of Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5, it is clear that RSGB,
STSTB and ConvGRU contribute to extract effective dis-
criminative features respectively. Finally, in comparison
between Model 5 and Model 7, binary supervision indeed
assists to distinguish live vs. spoof.
STSTB vs. OFF. As illustrated in Tab. 2, Model 7
with STSTB surpasses Model 6 with OFF for a large mar-
gin, which implies that the current and future gradient in-
formation is valuable for spatio-temporal face anti-spoofing
task. Model 6 even achieves inferior result compared with
Model 3, indicating that it is challenging to design an effec-
tive temporal module for depth regression task.
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Table 3. The results of intra-database testing on four protocols of
OULU-NPU. For a fair comparison, here the results STASN [53]
trained without extra private dataset are reported.
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
CPqD [6] 2.9 10.8 6.9
GRADIANT [6] 1.3 12.5 6.9
STASN [53] 1.2 2.5 1.9
Auxiliary [34] 1.6 1.6 1.6
FaceDs [26] 1.2 1.7 1.5
OURs 2.0 0.0 1.0
2
MixedFASNet [6] 9.7 2.5 6.1
FaceDs [26] 4.2 4.4 4.3
Auxiliary [34] 2.7 2.7 2.7
GRADIANT [6] 3.1 1.9 2.5
STASN [53] 4.2 0.3 2.2
OURs 2.5 1.3 1.9
3
MixedFASNet [6] 5.3±6.7 7.8±5.5 6.5±4.6
GRADIANT [6] 2.6±3.9 5.0±5.3 3.8±2.4
FaceDs [26] 4.0±1.8 3.8±1.2 3.6±1.6
Auxiliary [34] 2.7±1.3 3.1±1.7 2.9±1.5
STASN [53] 4.7±3.9 0.9±1.2 2.8±1.6
OURs 3.2±2.0 2.2±1.4 2.7±0.6
4
Massy HNU [6] 35.8±35.3 8.3±4.1 22.1±17.6
GRADIANT [6] 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
Auxiliary [34] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
STASN [53] 6.7±10.6 8.3±8.4 7.5±4.7
FaceDs [26] 1.2±6.3 6.1±5.1 5.6±5.7
OURs 6.7±7.5 3.3±4.1 5.0±2.2
Importance of Spatio-temporal Information for
Depth Refinement. It can be seen from Eq. 4 that the
depth map refinement is conducted in a weighted summa-
tion manner and hyperparameter α controls the contribu-
tion of the temporal depth maps predicted by STPM. As
shown in Fig. 7, with appropriate valuel of α, the model can
be benefited from spatio-temporal information and achieves
better performance than that using only spatial information
(α = 0.0). And the best performance can be obtained when
α = 0.6.
Influence of Sampling Interval in Spatio-temporal
Architecture. We conduct experiments on one sub-
protocol of Protocol 3 with various sampling intervals (4t).
When 4t euqals to 1, 3, 5, and 7 frame(s), the ACER is
3.347%, 2.927%, 4.223%, and 2.934%, respectively. The
ACER is the lowest when 4t = 3, which is used as the
default setting for the following intra- and cross-database
testing.
5.3.2 Intra-database Testing
We compare the performance of intra-database testing on
OULU-NPU, SiW and DMAD datasets. There are four
protocols in OULU-NPU for evaluating the generalization
of the developed face presentation attack detection (PAD)
methods. Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 are designed to eval-
uate the generalization of PAD methods under previously
unseen illumination scene and under unseen attack medium
(e.g., unseen printers or displays), respectively. Protocol 3
utilizes a Leave One Camera Out (LOCO) protocol, in or-
Table 4. The results of intra-database testing on three protocols of
SiW [34].
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
Auxiliary [34] 3.58 3.58 3.58
STASN [53] – – 1.00
OURs 0.64 0.17 0.40
2
Auxiliary [34] 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69
STASN [53] – – 0.28±0.05
OURs 0.00±0.00 0.04±0.08 0.02±0.04
3
STASN [53] – – 12.10±1.50
Auxiliary [34] 8.31±3.81 8.31±3.80 8.31±3.81
OURs 2.63±3.72 2.92±3.42 2.78±3.57
Table 5. The results of intra-database testing on DMAD.
Method Depth Map APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
Model 7 Generated 9.17 3.48 6.33Actual 6.36 2.75 4.55
der to study the effect of the input camera variation. Pro-
tocol 4 considers all the above factors and integrates all the
constraints from protocols 1 to 3, so protocol 4 is the most
challenging.
Results on OULU-NPU. As shown in Tab. 3, our pro-
posed method ranks first on all 4 protocols, which indicates
the proposed method performs well at the generalization of
the external environment, attack mediums and input camera
variation. It’s worth noting that our model has the lowest
mean and std of ACER in protocol 3 and 4, indicating its
good accuracy and stablity.
Results on SiW. Tab. 4 compares the performance
of our method with two state-of-the-art methods Auxil-
iary [34] and STASN [53] on SiW dataset. According to
the purposes of three protocols on SiW and the results in
Tab. 4, we can see that our method performs great advan-
tages on the generalization of (a) variations of face pose
and expression, (b) variations of different spoof mediums,
(c) cross presentation attack instruments.
Results on DMAD. The results of intra-database test-
ing on DMAD are shown in Tab. 5. In this experiment, we
still set spoofing depth map to zero when training the actual
depth model. Tab. 5 shows that the ACER(%) of multi-
frame model (Model 7) supervised by actual depth obtains
1.78 lower than that supervised by generated depth. This
demonstrates the actual depth map brings benefit to the im-
provement of monocular face anti-spoofing.
5.3.3 Cross-database Testing
We utilize four datasets (CASIA-MFSD, Replay-Attack,
SiW and OULU-NPU) to perform cross-database testing for
measuring the generalization potential of the models.
Results on CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack. In
this experiment, there are two cross-database testing pro-
tocols. One is training on the CASIA-MFSD and testing
on Replay-Attack, which we name protocol CR; the other
is training on the Replay-Attack and testing on CASIA-
7
Table 6. The results of cross-database testing between CASIA-
MFSD and Replay-Attack. The evaluation metric is HTER(%).
Method Train Test Train TestCASIA-
MFSD
Replay-
Attack
Replay-
Attack
CASIA-
MFSD
Motion [15] 50.2 47.9
LBP-1 [15] 55.9 57.6
LBP-TOP [15] 49.7 60.6
Motion-Mag [3] 50.1 47.0
Spectral cubes [44] 34.4 50.0
CNN [51] 48.5 45.5
LBP-2 [7] 47.0 39.6
STASN [53] 31.5 30.9
Colour Texture [8] 30.3 37.7
FaceDs [26] 28.5 41.1
Auxiliary [34] 27.6 28.4
OURs 17.0 22.8
Table 7. The results of cross-database testing from SiW to OULU-
NPU dataset.
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1 Auxiliary [34] – – 10.0OURs 1.7 13.3 7.5
2 Auxiliary [34] – – 14.1OURs 9.7 14.2 11.9
3 Auxiliary [34] – – 13.8±5.7OURs 17.5±4.6 11.7±12.0 14.6±4.8
4 Auxiliary [34] – – 10.0±8.8OURs 0.8±1.9 10.0±11.6 5.4±5.7
MFSD, which we name protocol RC. In Tab. 6, it is shown
that HTER(%) of our proposed method is 17.0 on protocol
CR and 22.8 on protocol RC, reducing 38.4% and 19.7%
respectively compared with the previous state of the art.
The improvement of performance on cross-database testing
demonstrates the good generalization of proposed method.
Results from SiW to OULU-NPU. Here, It is shown
that the cross-database testing results trained on SiW and
tested on OULU-NPU in Tab. 7. It can be seen that our
method outperforms Auxiliary [34] on three protocols (de-
crease 2.5%, 2.2% and 4.6% of ACER on protocol 1, pro-
tocol 2 and protocol 4, respectively). In protocol 3, ACER
of our method is 14.6±4.8% and slightly higher than that of
Auxiliary. Considering the rPPG used in Auxiliary method,
it may also be a good choice combined with proposed
method.
5.3.4 Visualization and Analysis
The predicted depth maps of hard samples in OULU-NPU
Protocol 3 are partly visualized in Fig. 8. It can be seen
that some samples are difficult for the single-frame PAD
to be detected. In contrary, our multi-frame methods with
STPM can estimate more precise depth maps than those of
single-frame method. The difference of depth images from
real and attack samples in third row is also more significant,
indicating the good discriminative information with the re-
sults of STPM.
Input
Single
Frame
Multi
Frame
Living Spoofing
Figure 8. The generated results of hard samples in OULU-NPU.
The predicted coarse depth maps from stacked RSGB backbone
and temporal depth maps from STPM are illustrated in the second
and third row, respectively.
Figure 9. Feature distribution visualization of the testing videos
on OULU-NPU Protocol 1 using t-SNE [36] . Left: fea-
tures w/o RSGB, Right: features w/ RSGB. Color indi-
cates red=live, green=printer1, blue=printer2, orange=display1,
black=display2.
Feature distribution of the testing videos on OULU-NPU
Protocol 1 is shown in Fig. 9. The right image (w/ RSGB)
presents more well-clustered behavior than the left image
(w/o RSGB), which demonstrates the excellent discrimina-
tion ability of our proposed RSGB for distinguishing the
living and spoofing faces.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel face anti-spoofing
method, which exploits fine-grained spatio-temporal infor-
mation for facial depth estimation. In our method, Residual
Spatial Gradient Block (RSGB) is utilized to detect more
discriminative details while Spatio-Temporal Propagation
Module (STPM) to encode spatio-temporal information. An
extra Contrastive Depth Loss (CDL) is designed to improve
the generality of depth-supervised PAD. We also investigate
the effectiveness of actual depth map in face anti-spoofing.
Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our
method.
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Appendix
7. Temporal Depth in Face Anti-spoofing
In this section, we use some simple examples to explain
that exploiting temporal depth and motion is reasonable in
the face anti-spoofing task.
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Figure 10. The schematic diagram of motion and depth variation
in different scenes.
7.1. Basic Scene
As shown in Fig. 10(a), node C denotes the camera fo-
cus. Image Plane represents the image plane of camera.
N(t) is one facial point at time t, and N(t+ ∆t) is the cor-
responding point when N(t) moves down vertically for ∆x
at time t+ ∆t. For example, N(t) can be the point of nose
or ear. f denotes the focal distance, and z is the horizontal
distance from the focal point to the point N(t). u and x are
the corresponding coordinates in vertical dimension. When
N(t) moves down vertically to N(t+ ∆t) for ∆x, the mo-
tion can be reflected on the image plane as ∆u. According
to the camera model, we can obtain:
x
u
=
z
f
,
⇔u = fx
z
.
(12)
When N(t) moves down vertically for ∆x to N(t + ∆t),
the ∆u can be achieved:
∆u =
f∆x
z
. (13)
As shown in Fig. 10(b), to distinguish points Nl, Nm
and Nr, we transform Eq. 13 and get ∆ul, ∆um and ∆ur
(∆um and ∆ur are not shown in the figure):
∆ul =
f∆x
z
,
∆um =
f∆x
z + d1
,
∆ur =
f∆x
z + d2
,
(14)
where d1 and d2 are the corresponding depth difference.
From Eq. 14, there are:
∆ul
∆um
=
z + d1
z
=
d1
z
+ 1,
∆ul
∆ur
=
z + d2
z
=
d2
z
+ 1.
(15)
Removing z from Eq. 15, d1/d2 can be obtained:
d1
d2
=
∆ul
∆um
− 1
∆ul
∆ur
− 1
, (16)
In this equation, we can see that the relative depth d1/d2
can be estimated by the motion of three points, when d2 6=
0. The equations above are about the real scenes. In the
following, we will introduce the derivation of attack scenes.
7.2. Attack Scene
7.2.1 What if the attack carriers move?
As shown in Fig. 10(c), there are two image spaces in attack
scenes: one is recording image space, where we replace z, f
by za, fa, and the other is realistic image space, where we
replace z, f by zb, fb. In the recording image space, it’s
similar to Eq. 14:
∆ul =
fa∆x
za
,
∆um =
fa∆x
za + d1
,
∆ur =
fa∆x
za + d2
,
(17)
where ∆ul,∆um,∆ur are the magnitude of optical flow
when three points Nl(t), Nm(t), Nr(t) move down verti-
cally for ∆x.
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In the realistic image space, there are:
∆u′l =
fb∆xl
zb
,
∆u′m =
fb∆xm
zb
,
∆u′r =
fb∆xr
zb
,
(18)
where ∆xl, ∆xm and ∆xr are the motion of three points
on the recording image plane, and ∆ul,∆um,∆ur are the
corresponding values mapping on the realistic image plane.
Actually, there are ∆xl = ∆ul,∆xm = ∆um,∆xr =
∆ur, if the recording screen is static. Now, a vertical mo-
tion ∆v is given to the recording screen, just as ∆xl =
∆ul + ∆v,∆xm = ∆um + ∆v,∆xr = ∆ur + ∆v. By
inserting ∆v, we transform Eq. 18 into:
∆u′l =
fafb∆x+ zafb∆v
zazb
,
∆u′m =
fafb∆x+ (za + d1)fb∆v
(za + d1)zb
,
∆u′r =
fafb∆x+ (za + d2)fb∆v
(za + d2)zb
,
(19)
Due to that only ∆u′l,∆u
′
m,∆u
′
r can be observed directly
in the sequential images, we can estimate the relative depth
via ∆u′l,∆u
′
m,∆u
′
r. So we leverage Eq. 16 to estimate the
relative depth d′1/d
′
2:
d′1
d′2
=
∆u′l
∆u′m
− 1
∆u′l
∆u′r
− 1
, (20)
and then we can insert Eq. 19 into Eq. 20 to get:
d′1
d′2
=
d1
d2
· fa∆x+ (za + d2)∆v
fa∆x+ (za + d1)∆v
. (21)
According to equations above, some important conclusions
can be summarized:
• If ∆x = 0, the scene can be recognized as print attack
and Eq. 21 will be invalid, for ∆u′l = ∆u
′
r, and the
denominator in Eq. 20 will be zero. So here we use
Eq. 19 and
∆u′l
∆u′m
=
d′1
zb
+ 1,
∆u′l
∆u′r
=
d′2
zb
+ 1,
(22)
to obtain:
d′1 = d
′
2 = 0. (23)
In this case, it’s obvious that the facial relative depth is
abnormal and the face is fake.
• If ∆x 6= 0, the scene can be recognized as replay at-
tack.
– If ∆v = 0, there is:
d′1
d′2
=
d1
d2
. (24)
In this case, if these two image planes are paral-
lel and the single-frame model can not detect the
static spoof cues, the model will fail in the task
of face anti-spoofing, owing to that the model is
hard to find the abnormality of relative depth esti-
mated from the facial motion. We call this scene
Perfect Spoofing Scene(PSS). Of course, mak-
ing up PSS will cost a lot and is approximately
impossible in practice.
– If ∆v 6= 0 and we want to meet Eq. 24, the fol-
lowing equation should be satisfied:
fa∆x+ (za + d2)∆v
fa∆x+ (za + d1)∆v
= 1, (25)
then,
(d2 − d1)∆v = 0,
⇔d2 − d1 = 0, if ∆v 6= 0.
(26)
However, in our assumption, d1 6= d2, so:
d′1
d′2
6= d1
d2
. (27)
This equation indicates that relative depth can’t
be estimated preciously, if the attack carrier
moves in the replay attack. And ∆v usually
varies when attack carrier moves in the long-term
sequence, leading to the variation of d′1/d
′
2. This
kind of abnormality is more obvious along with
the long-term motion.
• If d2 denotes the largest depth difference among facial
points, then d1/d2 ∈ [0, 1], showing that constraining
depth label of living face to [0, 1] is valid. As ana-
lyzed above, for spoofing scenes, the abnormal relative
depth usually varies over time, so it is too complex to
be computed directly. Therefore, we merely set depth
label of spoofing face to all 0 to distinguish it from liv-
ing label, making the model learn the abnormity under
depth supervision itself.
7.2.2 What if the attack carriers rotate?
As shown in Fig. 10(d), we rotate the recording image plane
for degree θ. ul2, ul1 are the coordinates of Nl(t), Nl(t +
∆t) mapping on the recording image plane. The two black
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points at the right end of green double arrows on recording
image plane (vertical) will reach the two black points at the
left end of green double arrow on recording image plane
(rotated), when the recording image plane rotates. And the
corresponding values ul2, ul1 will not change after rotation.
For convenient computation, we still map the rotated points
to the vertical recording image plane. And the coordinates
after mapping are u′l2, u
′
l1. c1, c2, h are the corresponding
distances shown in the figure. According to the relationship
of the foundamental variables, we can obtain:
h = ul1 cos θ,
zb
c1
=
u′l1
h
,
c2 = ul1 sin θ,
c1 + c2 = zb.
(28)
Deriving from equations above, we can get u′l1:
u′l1 =
zbul1 cos θ
zb − ul1 sin θ , (29)
and u′l2 can also be calculated by imitating Eq. 29:
u′l2 =
zbul2 cos θ
zb − ul2 sin θ . (30)
Subtract u′l1 from u
′
l2, the following is achieved:
u′l2 − u′l1 = (ul2 − ul1) ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − ul1 sin θ)(zb − ul2 sin θ) .
(31)
Obviously, ul2 − ul1 = ∆ul. We define u′l2 − u′l1 = ∆uθl .
And then we get the following equation:
∆uθl = ∆ul ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − ul1 sin θ)[zb − (ul1 + ∆ul) sin θ] ,
∆uθm = ∆um ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − um1 sin θ)[zb − (um1 + ∆ul) sin θ] ,
∆uθr = ∆ur ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − ur1 sin θ)[zb − (ur1 + ∆ul) sin θ] ,
(32)
where the relationship between ∆uθm,∆u
θ
r and
Nm(t), Nr(t) are just like that between ∆uθl and Nl(t),
as well as um1, ur1. Note that for simplification, we only
discuss the situation that ul1, um1, ur1 are all positive.
Reviewing Eq. 18, We can confirm that ∆xl = ∆uθl ,
∆xm = ∆u
θ
m, ∆xr = ∆u
θ
r . According to Eq. 20, the final
d′1/d
′
2 can be estimated:
d′1
d′2
=
∆ul
∆um
· β1 − 1
∆ul
∆ur
· β2 − 1
=
(
d1
za
+ 1) · β1 − 1
(
d2
za
+ 1) · β2 − 1
, (33)
where β1 and β2 can be represented as:
β1 =
(zb − um1 sin θ)(zb − um2 sin θ)
(zb − ul1 sin θ)(zb − ul2 sin θ) ,
β2 =
(zb − ur1 sin θ)(zb − ur2 sin θ)
(zb − ul1 sin θ)(zb − ul2 sin θ) ,
(34)
where ul2 = ul1 + ∆ul, um2 = um1 + ∆um, ur2 = ur1 +
∆ur. Observing Eq. 33, we can see if β1 < 1, β2 > 1 or
β1 > 1, β2 < 1, there will be d′1/d
′
2 6= d1/d2, .
Now, we discuss the sufficient condition of β1 < 1, β2 >
1. When um1 > ul1, um2 > ul2, ur1 < ul1, ur2 < ul2, the
β1 < 1, β2 > 1 can be established. Similar to Eq. 14, the
relationship of variables can be achieved:
faxl1
za
= ul1,
faxl2
za
= ul2,
faxm1
za + d1
= um1,
faxm2
za + d1
= um2,
faxr1
za + d2
= ur1,
faxr2
za + d2
= ur2,
(35)
From Eq. 35 and um1 > ul1, um2 > ul2, we can obtain:
xm1 > xl1 · za + d1
za
,
xm1 + ∆x > (xl1 + ∆x) · za + d1
za
,
(36)
xr1 < xl1 · za + d2
za
,
xr1 + ∆x < (xl1 + ∆x) · za + d2
za
,
(37)
where xl1, xl2, xm1, xm2, xr1, xr2 are corresponding coor-
dinates of Nl(t+ ∆t), Nl(t), Nm(t+ ∆t), Nm(t), Nr(t+
∆t), Nr(t) in the dimension of x in recording image space.
In facial regions, we can easily find corresponding points
Nl(t), Nm(t), which satisfy that d1  za (i.e., d1 = 0) and
xm1 > xl1. In this pattern, Eq. 36 can be established. To
establish Eq. 37, we only need to find point Nr(t), which
satisfies that xr1 < xl1. According to the derivation above,
we can see that there exists cases that d′1/d
′
2 < d1/d2.
And there are also many cases that satisfy d′1/d
′
2 > d1/d2,
which we do not elaborate here. When faces move, the ab-
solute coordinates xl1, xl2, xm1, xm2, xr1, xr2 vary, as well
as β1, β2, leading to the variation of estimated relative depth
of three facial points at different moments, which will not
occur in the real scene. That’s to say, if the realistic image
plane and recording image plane are not parallel, we can
seek cases to detect abnormal relative depth with the help
of abnormal facial motion.
7.2.3 Discussion
One of basis of the elaboration above is that the structure of
face is similar to that of the hill, which is complex, dense
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and undulate. This is interesting and worth being exploited
in face anti-spoofing.
Even though we only use some special examples to
demonstrate our viewpoints and assumption, they can still
prove the reasonability of utilizing facial motion to esti-
mate the relative facial depth in face anti-spoofing task. In
this way, the learned model can seek the abnormal relative
depth and motion in the facial regions. And our extensive
experiment demonstrates our assumption and indicates that
temporal depth method indeed improves the performance of
face anti-spoofing.
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